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ABSTRACT 
 
In tracing the development of law of contract in Malaysia, the article examines and discusses the ideologies and 
concepts that have been responsible in shaping and molding the law of contract in Malaysia and in its legal system. 
To achieve these objectives, the social, philosophical, economic and political thoughts and values that have 
influenced the law have been analyzed. A brief discussion on the current trend of the law is also included. 
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Undang-Undang Kontrak di Malaysia: Penterjemahan ke atas Ideologi dan 
Konsep 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Dalam usaha untuk meneliti pembangunan dalam undang-undang kontrak di Malaysia, artikel ini mengkaji dan 
membincangkan  ideologi dan konsep yang telah bertanggung jawab untuk membentuk dan menggarapkan undang-
undang kontrak di Malaysia serta sistem perundangannya. Untuk mencapai objektif tersebut, pemikiran dan nilai-
nilai sosial, filosofi, ekonomi dan politik yang telah mempengaruhi undang-undang telah dianalisis. Perbincangan 
rengkas mengenai tren undang-undang masakini juga disertakan. 
 
Katakunci: entiti politik, perundangan, judisiari, tradisi paternalistik 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior to the advent of the British, there had been some sort of judicial system in existence in the various 
places that are now called Malaysia. In each Malay state there was a separate political entity with its own 
ruler, legislature and judiciary. The sultans were the sovereign rulers in whom resided all legislative and 
executive power. Administration of justice was the responsibility of the Bendahara, the Temenggong    
and the Laksamana.
1
  As the law was based on customary law (with   the relic of Hindu law overlaid by 
Islamic law), it was thus governed   by paternalistic traditions that were mainly patriarchal in nature. In 
“Undang-undang Melaka” (a digest of law on Malacca), for example, it has been stated that the 
jurisdiction of this digest covered, “all larged lands and  by all  great rulers and their viziers and on the 
customs in the dependent areas and village.”
2 
 The paternalistic character was reflected  in the law of this 
digest which governed the responsibilities of the ruler and his chiefs, prohibitions amongst members of 
the community, penalties for criminal and civil offences, family law and other matters.
3 
 As such, the role 
of the individual was quite limited and to some extent appeared to be insignificant. This may also be 
because of the strict application of “autocratic” patriarchal customary law which demand total respect and 
loyalty to the rulers, the chiefs, the head of the family or the elders. Thus, any form of excessive 
individual freedom, such as the right of rebellion or the right to express one’s feeling may be interpreted 
as an act of disrespect or disloyal to the rulers, the chiefs, the head of the family or the elders.
4 
 
REKAYASA – Journal of ethics, legal and governance                                                             33 
Vol. 1, 2005 (32-39) 
 
   
 
However, the beginning of the nineteenth century witnessed some development in Malaysian legal 
system. During this colonial era, the British had introduced Western administration in the country,      
“the most important aspect of which was the effecting of British laws without, however, totally 
obliterating indigenous laws (especially with regard to land administration) and Islamic law.”
5 
  Indeed, 
English    law was adopted only so far as it was suitable to local conditions. In some instances, it was 
adopted indirectly and without statutory authority through the judiciary applying English legal principles 
to cases that came before them for determination.
6 
 In others, statutory authority including the Royal 
Charters of Justice
7 
  provided for the introduction of English law that were suitable to local conditions in 
the absence of local laws. This eventually led to “the introduction of the democratic process leading in 
1957 to the establishment of parliamentary democracy- with a written constitution, a House of 
Representatives (to which members are elected based on universal suffrage) and a Senate. In the process, 
the Malay Kingdoms were first united into a nation.”
8 
 
 
The colonial era also witnessed major economic transformation which is described by Prof. Khoo Kay 
Kim
9 
 as follows: 
 
“The early 19th century marked the beginning of an economy  anchored to the  export  of  raw  
materials. Tin  production  though  not  new  expanded  radically in response to Britain’s growing 
tin-plate industry; commercial agriculture, a new phenomenon, assumed increasingly greater 
importance; and the development of infrastructure to meet the needs of the new economy took off 
by the 1800s (railway, urbanization with all its ramifications, and road transport being the most 
important until World War 1)”. 
 
What ensued from this was the development of law in the area of commercial law. In 1878, for example, 
by virtue of section 6 of the Civil Law Ordinance 1878, English commercial law was introduced into  the  
Straits  Settlements.
10 
  It  then  became  clear  that  English law relating to contracts was applicable to 
Penang, Malacca and Singapore.
11 
 Similarly, by 1899, the Contract Enactment which was modelled on 
the Indian Contract Act 1872 (that was based on the English principles) was extended to the four states of 
the Federated Malay States. This Enactment of 1899 was then gradually extended to the Unfederated 
Malay States, with Johore as the first state to accept its application, as early as 1914. 
 
Freedom of Contract Ideology as Reflected  in the Contracts Act 1950 
 
The oldest printed version of the provisions relating to contracts is the Contract Enactment 1899. 
However, it was not formally passed by the Federal Legislative Council of the Federation of Malaya until 
1950. The Contract Ordinance 1950 was then revised in 1974 and it became an Act by virtue of the 
Revision of Laws Act 1968. 
 
The Malaysian  Contracts Act  1950  has  its  forbear  in  the Indian Contract Act 1872, thus, naturally the 
provisions contained in the Act reflect  the English model of contract theory of the nineteenth century 
which was closely related to the development of the free market and the ideals of classical economics. In 
other words, the 1950 Act would be based on the then prevailing judicial philosophy of laissez-faire 
based on the conception of the rugged individualist. Indeed, this was judicially recognised by the Privy 
Council in the Malaysian case of   Ooi Boon Leong & Ors v Citibank N A.
12 
  The main legal issue in this 
case was whether the parties to a contract can contract out of the provisions of the Contracts Act 1950. 
The Privy Council, in allowing the parties concerned to contract out of the provisions of the Contracts   Act, 
referred to section 1(2) of the Act
13 
 which was strongly relied by the appellants in this case.  
 
“Section 1(2) has no effect on the freedom of contracting parties to decide upon what terms they desire to 
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contract. It would be indeed surprising if so devastating an inroad into the common law right of freedom 
of contract were introduced  by  the  legislature in a  section which is primarily devoted to expressing the 
short title to the Act and which moreover appear in a part of the Act which is merely headed 
‘Preliminary’.”
14  
 
In a similar vein, the Privy Council further observed:   
 
“Random recognition in certain sections of the Act of the fundamental principle that contracting 
parties are at liberty toexpress their intentions in their contracts as they please is quite insufficient 
to support the contrary   proposition  that  the  absence  of  such  recognition in another  section 
implies the  absence  of  freedom  of  contract. If freedom of contract is to be curtailed in relation 
to a particular subject matter, their Lordships would expect the prohibition to be expressed in the 
statute, and not left by the legislature to be picked up by the reader as an implication based upon 
sections dealing with different subject matters.”
15
 
 
It is significant  that the Privy Council in this case emphasized the principle of freedom of contract as 
being paramount in the judicial consideration of the operation of the Contracts Act. Thus, the above 
observations illustrate that according to the Privy Council the doctrine of freedom of contract is the 
superstructure upon which the Contracts Act, 1950 is built. It is also quite apparent that the notion of 
individual liberty emphasized in the above quoted passage reflects  the influence   of the will theory on 
the law of contract. 
 
Indeed, the central theme of the freedom of contract doctrine is the individual and the choice that he has 
freely made. This theme appears   to be so embedded in the provisions of the Contracts Act 1950 that 
section 10 of the Act defines contracts as, “all agreements made with the free consent of parties 
competent to contract..”. 
 
Hence, the foundation of legal liability is the consent of both parties, freely given, to be bound by their 
agreement. Factors which vitiate such consent, for example, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation and 
certain categories of mistake
16 
 are simply illustrations of defective consent or unfree will which render the 
resulting agreement voidable. The Contract Act’s obsession with free consent is explained by Noor 
Alam
17 
 as being: 
 
“...deeply rooted in the assumption of the freedom of contract doctrine that every individual is 
equally capable of making a rational choice. Once that choice has been made, the law will not go 
behind it to enquire into the social and environmental setting that influence the choice and render 
its ‘free’ characteristic merely illusory.” 
 
Clearly, the Contracts Act has fostered the idea of freedom of contract and adopted an objective view of 
agreement which makes the law     more concerned with the procedural aspect of fairness rather than the 
substantive fairness of a transaction. This characteristic of nineteenth century ideology of law is reflected 
in the general principles embodied in the provisions of the Act, which will be discussed below. 
 
Firstly, as in the classical contract theory, the Contracts Act emphasizes the rule of offer and acceptance. 
An agreement arrived at through the mechanism of offer and acceptance is regarded as a manifestation of   
the meeting minds of the parties.
18 
 Secondly, neither party owes any duty to volunteer information to the 
other, thus as the Explanation to section 17 of the Act
19 
 provides, “Mere silence as to facts likely to affect 
the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud.” This is merely a restatement of the 
common law. It is only if, “the circumstances of the case are such that, ... it is the duty of the person 
keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent     to speech” that the other party is 
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entitled to rely upon them. 
 
Nevertheless, the one significant difference is that, under the Contract Act, the misrepresentation or 
silence which is fraudulent in the context of section 17 will not render the contract voidable if the other 
party whose consent was caused by that misrepresentation or fraudulent silence had the means of 
discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. Thirdly, the emphasis on contract law as the law of the 
market is also reflected  in the narrow application of the doctrine of mistake   under the Contracts Act. 
Under section 23, for instance, parties will not be easily discharged from their contractual undertakings 
simply because they entered into the contract under some mistake. As under the classical contract theory, 
the Contract Act takes a predominantly objective view of agreement. Thus, “an erroneous opinion as to 
the value of the thing which forms the subject-matter of the agreement is not to be deemed a mistake”.
20 
 
It is not, in general, the subjective intention of the parties with which the Act is concerned, but rather what 
can be inferred from their conduct. Finally, the concept of freedom of contract being the foundation of the 
Contracts Act 1950 is further emphasised by the fact that the Act contains a provision which renders all 
contracts in restraint of trade void (subject to the limited exceptions).
21 
 The object of this provision 
appears to be protecting the public interest, in particular to prevent monopoly of business, trade and 
profession which seemed appropriate during the nineteenth century as the economy was only beginning to 
develop. 
 
From  what  was  mentioned  above,  all  these  rules  can  probably be rationalised in terms of the 
underlying doctrine of freedom of contract in the Contracts Act. Where both parties are of full age, fully 
competent to negotiate a deal and to take the necessary and ordinary precautions, the law will not 
intervene to correct any imbalance in the exchange or bargain which has been agreed upon by the parties. 
In the interests of certainty and commercial convenience, parties are bound    by their apparent agreement. 
Nevertheless, although the Contracts Act fostered the ideology of freedom of contract in most of its 
provisions, there are, however, some provisions that restrict the freedom of the parties to contract, for 
example, those dealing with contracts which    are illegal, immoral or against public policy or agreements, 
which contravene any statutory law.
22  
 
State Intervention 
 
Apart  from  the  Contracts Act  1950,  which  fostered  the  idea  of freedom of contract, the movement 
towards economic liberalism had never quite made any significant  impact in social, economic and legal 
aspects of life in theory and practice in Malaysia. This may be partly because of the strict application of 
autocratic patriarchal customary law that had been in practiced throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century which to a certain extent restricted individual freedom and his right of choice. Whatever freedom 
a man desire had to be within the limit of the customary law and according to the prevailing views in the 
community of what was right and wrong. Apart from this, Malaysia too had never experienced a 
revolution such as the Industrial Revolution that took place in England which began around the middle of 
the eighteenth century. Hence, the effect of such an experience was less effective here in Malaysia and it 
had     not influenced any significant change in the system. 
 
Furthermore, the failure of the free market to conform with the social and economic reality which led to 
monopoly and concentration of trade and industries in England, might also hinder the development of this 
movement in Malaysia. The fact that the market economy could no longer accorded with the reality of the 
modern world could have made the ideology of economic liberalism seems fallacy to Malaysian 
economist. 
 
In modern Malaysia, it will be observed that since independence
23 
 the government of Malaysia
24 
 does not 
seem to favour the free market  ideology. This is evident from the government’s direct involvement in the 
Malaysian economy. Most of the public enterprises at the time of independence were controlled by the 
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government and although at the beginning they were engaged in traditional activities associated    with  
public  utilities,  transportation,  communication,  agriculture development and finance, it had since then 
been extended to the manufacturing and service sectors.
25 
 The rapid expansion of public enterprises could 
be seen, in particular, in the 1970s-1980s. The government believes that such direct involvement in 
economy is necessary in order to promote social-economic development. It is also to foster racial 
harmony in Malaysia - by balancing the wealth     and advantage between the Malay and non-Malays.
26
  A 
reflection of this belief is noted by Ghazali Yusoff
27 
 when he discusses racial harmony in Malaysia: 
“since independence, the government has recognized that economic inequalities could provide 
“flashpoint” in society. Such an occurrence did take place in 1969 and a pragmatic and affirmative social 
engineering programme was introduced - the New Economic Policy (NEP)
28 
 - to review the balance of 
wealth between the Malays and non-Malays. This engineering continues till today and it has taken place 
with little traumatic responses from the other races.” 
 
At this juncture, perhaps it ought to be pointed out that the Malaysian government’s economic policy 
appears, to some extent, to resemble the collectivistic policy. Collectivism was concerned about equalities 
and   the protection of the weak against the strong. To them, state help and intervention were necessary in 
order to help balance the inequalities of wealth and distribution of the national production among the 
people. Thus, both collectivism and the Malaysian government’s economic policy seem to be based on 
the same ground, that is, the faith in the    mass of people and the benefit which they will receive by the 
action of the state, or its intervention even in the private sector if necessary. 
 
State intervention can also be seen in many government regulations that intervene with private contractual 
relationship. This is reflected,   for example, in relation to insurance and employment contracts by the 
Insurance Act 1965 and the Road Traffic Act 1958 which dictate many  of  the  terms  of  insurance  
contracts,  and  the  Employment (Termination and Lay-off Benefits) Regulations, 1980 which deal     
with an employer’s liability for termination and lay-off benefits in employment  contracts.  However,  
state  intervention  in  consumer protection legislation is quite minimal in Malaysia. This in part is  due to 
the limited acceptance of laissez-faire. Nevertheless, some statutes do exist which, to some degree, 
indicate state intervention in private contractual relationships. For example, the Sale of Goods Act 1957, 
the Hire-Purchase Act 1967 and the National Land Code 1965 which specifically  provide that certain 
terms are to be implied into particular contracts. Of a similar effect is the Moneylenders Act 1951 which 
involves some interventions in the express terms of contracts for consumer credit. In addition, the 
government’s interest in consumer protection has recently been renewed with the enactment of the 
Consumer Protection Act 1999 which, it is claimed, to be the   first comprehensive protection Act in 
Malaysia. 
 
State intervention is also reflected in the administration of Muslim law in the country. For example, in 
each state, Islamic law is administered according  to  the Administration  of  Muslim  Law  Enactments  
or Ordinances.
29 
 These Enactments are similar in content and they mainly govern the laws concerning 
marriage and divorce, maintenance of dependants, guardianship or custody of infants among Muslims. 
Recently, Islamic tenets have been extended into other areas such as banking and insurance law which is 
governed by the Islamic Banking Act. This is the government’s attempt to merge religious practices     
with business law. Although these banking and insurance systems are offered to Muslim and non-Muslim 
customers, the laws are only applicable to those who opt for them.  
 
Nevertheless,  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  here  that  although  the government’s presence can be felt in 
most of the economic, social and legal aspects of life in Malaysia, recently there has been an attempt to 
reduce its size and presence in the economy and to allow market forces to govern economic activities. 
This is reflected in the privatisation policy which was introduced in 1983. “It made explicit that excessive 
government’s presence in the economy be reduced, while emphasizing an increasing role by the private 
sector. The factors underlying this change signalled the Malaysian government’s intent to realign the 
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balance between the public and private sector’s responsibilities”,
30
 and it also complements other national 
policies such as “Malaysia Incorporated”,
31 
 formulated to further strengthen the role of the private sector 
as the engine in the economy. However, it is still not clear to what extent these pragmatic approaches will 
affect the government’s ideology. But today, privatisation is increasingly being expanded by    the 
government through government-owned enterprises as well as new projects. 
 
External Influences Affecting Malaysian Contract Law 
 
The evolution of new doctrines and approaches in English law such as economic duress, inequality of 
bargaining power and the broader doctrine of unconscionability has to a certain degree influenced the 
development of Malaysian contract law. Although the Contracts Act does not incorporate such principles 
as economic duress, inequality of bargaining power or unconscionability as have recently been developed 
in English law, there is some evidence to indicate that such principles are judicially recognised in 
Malaysia. The courts have dealt with such issues although their status and application are still a matter of 
debate. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the matter in depth. Suffice to mention 
here that, this does    not mean that the Malaysian courts will blindly adopt all the new doctrines that have 
been developed by the English law. Any doctrines   or approaches which do not accord with the moral 
standards of the society or which contravene public policy will not be accepted by the Malaysian courts. 
This was made clear by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Tengku Abdullah Ibni Sultan Abu Bakar 
Mohd Latiff & Ors
32 
, when it refused to extent the doctrine of undue influence to non-marital 
relationships on grounds of public policy. The decision in this case illustrates that the courts recognised 
the right to modify principles of the common law and doctrines of equity that have their historical origins 
in England to suit the domestic needs of the Malaysian jurisdiction. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As will be apparent from the above discussion, the significance of the role played by an individualist 
society in the development of modern English contract law can scarcely be denied. Indeed, the origin and, 
to a large extent, the heyday of modern contract law began in the period  of individualism where the 
emphasis upon freedom of choice, the value of a free market economy and a less paternalistic role for the    
state were associated with the classical law of contract. As Wheeler
33
 observes, “ the modern paradigm of 
contract owes much to what is often termed the ‘classical law of contract’, a body of rules principally 
formulated in the nineteenth century, in the search to set out a coherent and consistent operating 
framework for the exercise of private autonomy through agreement.” However, because of the failure of  
individualism, the classical theory of contract has less relevance today. 
 
In turn, the interventionist approach  “paternalism”  is now seen as  a legitimate function of the law. There 
is formal acknowledgement that certain contracting parties need the protection of the law against 
economic exploitation and oppression. Contract law is changing to reflect these changes in economic 
reality. 
 
In Malaysia, the growth and development of the classical model of contract naturally produced a profound 
impact on the Malaysian Contracts Act 1950. As noted earlier, this classical theory of contract law is 
mirrored in most of the provisions embodied in the Act. But   apart from the 1950 Act, it is probably fair 
to say that the classical theory has played a less significant role over human affairs and conduct in 
Malaysia. A relatively excessive interventionist approach adopted by the government has inevitably 
restricted the growth of this theory. As a result, some degree of paternalism can be felt in the 
government’s regulations, policies and administrations. But this does not seem to hinder the development 
of contract law in Malaysia. Although the changing process is much slower than in England, it is evident 
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that the contract law in Malaysia is moving towards a significant change as in English law. 
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ENDNOTES 
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 The power of the Bendahara could be equated with the power of the Prime Minister today, whilst the 
Temenggong had the power of a Chief of Police and the Laksamana had the power of an oficer who 
executed the sentenced passed, aside from being the Commander-in-Chief. 
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206. 
7
 The first Charter of Justice was introduced in 1807, followed by the second and third Charters in 1826 
and 1855 respectively. 
8
 Prof. Khoo Kay Kim, “Malaysia Heritage and Culture: Past, Present and Future” in Malaysia Today 
Towards The New Millennium (1997) at 306. 
9 
Ibid. 
10 
This provision is now found in section 5(2) of the Civil Law Act 1956 (Act 67) (Revised 1972). 
11 
English law relating to contracts continued to apply to Penang and Malacca up to 1974, when Contracts 
Act was extended to these two states. 
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12 
Section 1(2) of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that: “Nothing herein contained shall effect any written 
law or any usage or custom of trade, or any incident of any contract, not inconsistent with this Act.” 
13 
Ibid at 226. 
14 
Ibid. 
15 
See section 14 of  the Contracts Act 1950. 
16 
See Part II of the Contracts Act 1950, in particular sections 4-9. 
17 
Section 17 of the Contracts Act deals with the element of fraud. 
18 
See Explanation to section 21 of the Contracts Act 1950. 
19 
See for example Exceptions 1-3 of section 28 of the Contracts Act 1950. 
20 
See for example section 24 (a) - (e) of the Contracts Act 1950. 
21 
Malaysia gained independence in 1957. 
22 
There has only been one government in Malaysia since independence, that is, the Barisan National and 
it has been in power for nearly 47 years now. 
23 
For further study see Vijayakumari Kanapathy and Ismail Muhd Salleh, Malaysia Economy: Selected 
Issues and Policy Directions (1994) at 167. 
24 
The majority population in Malaysia consists of Malay, Chinese and Indian. 
25 
Ghazali Yusoff, “The Malaysian Concept of Multireligious and Racial Harmony” in Malaysia Today 
Towards the New Millenium (1997) at 316. 
26 
In 1990, the New Economic Policy is replaced by the National Development Policy (NDP). 
27 
See  the  Muslim  Courts  (Criminal  Jurisdiction) Act  1965,  as amended by the Muslim Courts 
(Criminal Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Act 1984 with effect from 1st January 1985. 
28 
Ismail Muhd Salleh, “Privatisation and Deregulation in Malaysia: Progress,  Problems  and  Prospects”,  
in Vijayakumari  Kanapathy, Malaysian Economy: Selected Issues and Policy Directions (1994) at 165. 
29 
The term “Malaysia Incorporated” is used to describe the special relationship the nation aspires to 
achieve between the public and    private sectors as a means to mould the nation into an advance, affluent 
industrial society. 
30 
[1996] 4 MLJ 331. 
31 
Wheeler, Contract Law: Cases, Material and Commentary (1996) at 52. 
